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Abstract
Many randomized controlled trials require participants to opt in. Such self-
selection could introduce a potential bias, because only the most optimistic may
participate. We revisit this prediction. We argue that in many situations, the
experimental intervention is competing with alternative interventions participants
could conduct themselves outside the experiment. Since participants have a chance
of being assigned to the control group, participating has a direct opportunity cost,
which is likely to be higher for optimists. We propose a model of self-selection and
show that both pessimists and optimists may opt out of the experiment, leading to
an ambiguous selection bias.
Keywords: Field experiments, selection bias, randomized controlled trials, external valid-
ity
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1. Introduction
The last decade has seen a booming increase in popularity of field experiments in eco-
nomics (Holt, 2005) and there is now a stronghold of researchers advocating the case for
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to overcome the challenges of endogeneity (Burtless,
1995, Duflo and Kremer, 2005). One key issue is external validity, specifically, we would
like to know if we can generalize the lessons we draw from such experiments to the wider
population.1 The answer to this question depends on the representativeness of the sample
along characteristics that may be correlated with the estimated treatment effects. In that
context, self-selection deserves prime attention.
1A number of recent papers study self-selection in field experiments: Allcott and Mullainathan (2012),
Belot and James (2013), Gautier and van der Klaauw (2012).
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In almost all randomized controlled experiments in social sciences, participation is
voluntary. Researchers are well aware of the implications of self-selection for external
validity. The standard prediction in the literature on selection in randomised field experi-
ments is a positive selection bias, following the spirit of the literature on policy evaluation
(Heckman and Vytlacil, 2006 and Heckman et al., 1999). List and Rasul (2011) state that
“Indeed, in almost any social experiment related to job training programs, it is a concern
that those most likely to benefit from the program select into the program.”
We argue that this prediction is not necessarily correct because participating to the
experiment does not guarantee treatment and entails a chance of ending up in the control
group. Being assigned to the control group often entails an opportunity cost. Participants
are often required not to conduct any competing intervention (and certainly not the
experimental intervention itself) at the same time. Almost all RCTs (in medical and
social sciences) entail such opportunity cost.
In many situations, the intervention to be tested already exists and the main goal of
the RCT is to establish causality. The key reason why causality is difficult to establish
is because of self-selection: Those who are already exposed to the treatment are not a
random sample of the population and are likely to be those who benefit most from the
treatment. In fact, researchers often look for “virgin samples”, i.e. participants who have
not yet been exposed to the treatment. Or, alternatively, participants themselves will
not see the point of participating if they are already implementing the intervention. For
example, a firm that implements a tournament incentive scheme may not be interested
in testing the effects of a tournament, particularly if it means there is a chance they may
have to give it up temporarily (or have a smaller proportion of their workers exposed
to the tournament scheme) if they end up in the control group. Of course this obvi-
ously introduces a selection bias which, surprisingly, has received little attention in the
literature.
2. The Model
A. The traditional problem of selection bias
Consider, the average treatment effect, that is the treatment effect averaged over the
population of interest. In the case of policy evaluation studies, the treatment is usually a
policy intervention such as an active labour market policy.
2
Let us define an individual as the unit that will correspond to the unit of randomization
in the next sections. It could be a person, a firm, a school or any organization. The
researcher is interested in testing the effectiveness of a specific treatment or intervention,
TA, with TA = 0 if the individual is not treated and TA = 1 if the individual is treated.
The level y achieved by individual i is a function of the treatment:
yi(TAi) = β0i + βAiTAi + ui, (1)
where β0i and βAi are unknown parameters and ui is an individual specific error term. Ob-
viously there is an issue of selection bias only if there is heterogeneity in the effectiveness
of an intervention across individuals (βAi are individual specific) in a way that cannot be
fully controlled for (i.e. there are conditional on unobservable characteristics of the pop-
ulation). In general, βAi is a function of observable and unobservable characteristics Xi :
βAi = g(Xi, ui). Ignore, for now, the possibility of conducting an RCT. If the intervention
was available to everyone, the decision to conduct the intervention would depend on the
expected marginal benefit of the intervention. More precisely, suppose individuals have
a prior β∗Ai regarding the effectiveness of treatment A. β
∗
Ai is a draw from a distribution
F (βAi),and assume that E(β
∗
Ai) = βAi (without loss of generality)
2 and defined on the
support [βA,min, βA,max]. Suppose conducting the intervention has a fixed cost cA that we
assume identical across individuals.
The expected net benefit of conducting the intervention is β∗Ai − cA. Only those
with β∗Ai > cA will conduct the intervention. This type of selection corresponds to the
“traditional” selection bias usually considered in the policy evaluation literature. Those
who would implement the treatment are those with the highest expected marginal benefits
of the treatment. Given that priors are correlated with the truth, the estimated average
treatment effect β̂A will be a positively biased estimate of βA.
B. Randomized-Controlled Experiments
The main point of an RCT is to get rid of the selection problem described above. Sup-
pose the researcher is interested in estimating βA (the average treatment effect across all
individuals). An unbiased estimate of βAwould be obtained by a randomised controlled
trial, with a group of NTreat individuals assigned at random to a treatment group (who
2Note that the argument carries through even if priors are systematically biased upwards or down-
wards.
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receive treatment A) and a group of NControl individuals assigned at random to a control
group (who do not receive the treatment). The key assumption to obtained an unbiased
estimate of βA is E(TAi|ui) = 0, that is the assignment to treatment and control is random
and is uncorrelated with unobservable characteristics. In that case:
β̂A =
∑
i∈Treatment yi
NTreat
−
∑
i∈Control yi
NControl
(2)
= yTreat − yControl
C. Outside Option and Competing Interventions
We now discuss the issue of self-selection in a world where possible competing and similar
interventions may exist. For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume there is one
possible alternative intervention TB.
Definition 1. Intervention TB is said to be competing with the experimental interven-
tion TA if it cannot be (practically) implemented in conjunction with the experimental
intervention.
For example, a firm that implements a tournament cannot implement a piece-rate
scheme for the same workers.
Definition 2. Intervention TB is said to be similar to the intervention TA if the prior
beliefs of the treatment effects of interventions TA and TB (β
∗
Ai
, β∗Bi) are positively corre-
lated.
For example, Belot et al. (2013) consider an intervention consisting of rewarding
children for eating fruit and vegetables at lunch. The intervention was conducted at
the school level. There are obviously other candidate interventions to increase fruit and
vegetable consumption, and schools could hold positively correlated beliefs regarding the
effectiveness of these interventions. A special case is if TA itself is available outside the
experimental setting.
In principle, those in the control group are not treated and may be involved in other
interventions. There are two typical cases. First, participants in the control group are
told not to implement TA or any other treatment that is both competing and similar to
TA. Second, which is typical in medical trials, the control group can continue to take the
current best treatment that is available (TB), but will not have access to TA. If that is
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the case, then the estimated effect will only capture the net difference between the effect
of the experimental intervention and the effect of alternative competing interventions. In
contrast, non-participants can always implement TB or even TA if it is available to them.
D. Participation Decision and Selection Bias
In this section we will derive the participation constraints for the two cases described
above. Consider first the situation where E(β∗A) ≥ E(β∗B) and E(β∗A) ≥ 0, that is, the
experimental intervention is, a priori, believed to be more effective than the interventions
that are currently available, and TA is believed to have a positive effect.
Presumably there is a direct cost of participating in the experiment, which we denote
k (such as providing support for data collection, etc.) but also a potential subsidy s.
Also, implementing intervention TB has a cost cB (assumed identical for all individuals).
Denote g¯ = pi(streat − k − cA) + (1− pi)(scontrol − k).
Case 1 Intervention TB is not available to the control group.
Then the decision to participate in the experiment must satisfy:
piβ∗Ai + g¯ ≥ max{β∗Bi − cB, 0}, (3)
where β∗Bi is i’s prior belief about the effectiveness of TB.
We now derive the participation constraints. We first start with the optimists (such
that β∗Bi ≥ cB). The decision to participate to the experiment satisfies:
piβ∗Ai + g¯ ≥ β∗Bi − cB if β∗Bi ≥ cB (4)
⇔
β∗Bi ≤ piβ∗Ai + g¯ + cB if β∗Bi ≥ cB (5)
Without loss of generality, let us take the example where β∗Bi is a linear projection of
β∗Ai, i.e. β
∗
Bi = ρβ
∗
Ai + ηi, with ρ being a fixed parameter and ηi an error term, with mean
zero and variance σ2η. We can then write condition [4] as:
(ρ− pi)β∗Ai ≤ g¯ + cB − ηi if β∗Bi ≥ cB (6)
If ρ > pi :
β∗Ai ≤
g¯ + cB − ηi
(ρ− pi) if β
∗
Bi ≥ cB (7)
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If ρ > pi, then there will be a negative selection bias. All else equal, the higher the
correlation between TA and TB the more negative selection there is.
If ρ < pi, then positive selection could take place:
β∗Ai ≥
g¯ + cB − ηi
(ρ− pi) if β
∗
Bi ≥ cB (8)
In contrast, the participation constraint for pessimists (those such that β∗Bi < cB)
satisfies:
piβ∗Ai + g¯ ≥ 0 if β∗Bi < cB (9)
⇔ (10)
β∗Ai ≥ −
g¯
pi
(11)
These two conditions show that positive and negative selection can take place at the
same time. Without further assumptions on the distribution and joint distribution of β∗Ai
and β∗Bi, we cannot draw conclusions on the direction of the bias.
Case 2 Intervention TB is available to the control group.
This second case corresponds to Malani (2008) implies a lower implicit cost of partic-
ipating in the experiment. But more importantly, the implications for selection are very
different.
Here the decision to participate to the experiment must satisfy:
piβ∗Ai + (1− pi) max{β∗Bi − cB, 0}+ g¯ ≥ max{β∗Bi − cB, 0}, (12)
piβ∗Ai + (1− pi)(β∗Bi − cB) + g¯ ≥ β∗Bi − cB if β∗Bi − cB ≥ 0 (13)
pi(β∗Ai − β∗Bi + cB) + g¯ ≥ 0 if β∗Bi − cB ≥ 0 (14)
pi(β∗Ai − β∗Bi) ≥ −cB − g¯ if β∗Bi − cB ≥ 0 (15)
If β∗Ai > β
∗
Bi, which we have assumed is true in expectations, then those who are
optimistic about A will opt in, then the constraint is always satisfied if cB + g¯ > 0, which
is likely to be the case in a typical randomised controlled experiment. In that case, no
negative selection takes place.
However, if the non-participants have access to TA, while the control group does not
(and only has access to TB), then the participation condition becomes:
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piβ∗Ai + (1− pi)(β∗Bi − cB) + g¯ ≥ β∗Ai − cA if β∗Ai − cA ≥ β∗Bi − cB ≥ 0
β∗Ai ≤
cA + g¯
(1− pi) + (β
∗
Bi − cB)
(1− ρ)β∗Ai ≤
cA + g¯
(1− pi) − cB + ηi,
such that the most optimistic will select out to implement TA outside the experiment.
There could still be positive selection in the case where B is not attractive to non-
participants or participants in the control group.
piβ∗Ai + g¯ ≥ 0 if β∗Bi − cB < 0,
β∗Ai ≥ −
g¯
pi
if β∗Bi − cB < 0.
3. Conclusion
This paper discusses the implications of self-selection into randomized controlled field
experiments. We point out that in many situations; alternatives to the experimental
intervention (or the intervention itself) are available outside the experiment. The impli-
cation is that being part of the control group entails an opportunity cost, which could
lead to both positive and negative selection at the same time.
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